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Wittgenstein keeps drawing our attention to the fact that 
inner mental states are something very different from what 
is happening outside, in the visible world of time and 
space, and that we should be most careful when talking 
about both the inner and the outer in grammatically similar 
ways. He finds it peculiar and “remarkable” that we do in 
fact talk this way: “Don’t look at it as a matter of course, 
but as a most remarkable thing [etwas sehr Merkwürdi-
ges], that the verbs ‘believe’, ‘wish’, ‘will’ display all the 
inflexions [alle die grammatischen Formen] possessed by 
‘cut’, ‘chew’, ‘run’” (PI IIx 190). Cutting, chewing, and run-
ning are events happening in physical, measurable time 
and space. They have parts, such as your hand, a knife, 
and a piece of wood with its peculiar shape and grain; or 
your legs, feet, shoes, and the path you run on. Events 
such as running and cutting can be described in terms of 
their parts and their relative positions and changes of posi-
tion, similar to the way we describe, and thereby explain, 
the workings of a sewing machine. But believing, wishing, 
and willing (wollen) cannot be described in this way, be-
cause mental states are not processes like that. Although 
we talk of “workings” of the mind (innere Vorgänge), those 
workings don’t have parts the way cutting, chewing, and 
running do. Usual “surface grammar” does not distinguish 
between these two groups of verbs, and we should there-
fore pay attention to “depth grammar” (Tiefengrammatik, PI 
664), which is sensitive to uses and situations. Linguistic 
“surface grammar” can be misleading. It can suggest 
wrong parallels of understanding. “No wonder we find it 
difficult to find our way about” (PI 664). Wittgenstein there-
fore points out fine differences in our everyday use of 
words. He wants to dissuade us, and himself, from making 
overgeneralizations and drawing false parallels. This is the 
therapeutic aspect of his philosophy.  
But I do not think that this is all. It is not only ther-
apy. Wittgenstein keeps returning to our inner mental 
states, sensations, hopes, wishes, beliefs, thoughts, fears, 
feelings, attitudes, opinions, memories, expectations, and 
intentions, and he looks closely at the ways we express 
them in words and gestures. He describes and (together 
with the psychologist, PI 571) “observes” them. And he 
does more than that. He also introduces speculative no-
tions of his own, such as “meaning blindness” and “aspect 
blindness” (PI IIxi 213-4). Someone who cannot see some-
thing as something, who cannot make and suddenly feel 
the duck-rabbit switch, and who has no feeling for words, 
is called “aspect blind” or “meaning blind”. Such a person 
lacks something, and Wittgenstein wonders whether we 
can really imagine such a “person”, or if it must not be a 
soulless machine. These are idiosyncratic Wittgensteinian 
conceptions, not wrong ideas other philosophers have and 
that he, Wittgenstein, wants to cure them of. You might say 
that he wants to cure himself. But I think he makes these 
considerations in order to say something positive that goes 
beyond mere therapy. Wittgenstein, especially the late 
Wittgenstein, is not just a therapist.  
But what exactly is he after when he thinks about 
the experience we have when uttering a word (Bedeu-
tungserlebnis), or, even more strangely, when he thinks 
about the experience we have when trying to have the 
wrong experience when uttering a word in a sentence? 
What is the point of such introspective mental gymnastics? 
(Kripke and Rees think that Wittgenstein’s investigation is 
introspective here and that the issue whether a meaning-
blind person is possible or not is not entirely resolved. 
Schulte argues against this reading: It is not introspection 
that is going on, and a meaning-blind person is no doubt 
impossible for Wittgenstein (Schulte 66-74). See also 
Wenzel (to appear).)  
It is ethical and aesthetic aspects that come into 
play here and that matter to Wittgenstein. The inner and 
the outer, our inner feelings and outer expressions, are 
intertwined. You can immediately see someone’s feeling 
on his or her face and you react to this. The word “Schu-
bert” and the ring and atmosphere it has for us, are inter-
laced with his work and our ideas of it. Our feeling and 
reaction is not mediated through some inner representa-
tion or picture that we might somehow have, floating in 
front of our inner eye. Rather, the reaction is immediate. It 
is for this reason, I think, that the fine aesthetic differences 
matter to Wittgenstein, and that he thinks they should mat-
ter to us as well. The words and expressions we use are 
carried and sustained by society, and we are part of this 
society by using them. Those words, gestures, and facial 
expressions live in that society, and our using them comes 
with a certain responsibility, namely that of keeping and 
maintaining their use in a meaningful way. This, I suggest, 
is a positive aspect in Wittgenstein’s work. I will come back 
to this. 
The interwovenness of feeling and expression and 
the immediacy of our reaction are reflected in our attitudes 
towards others. Wittgenstein writes: “I always presuppose 
that the one who smiles is a human being and not just that 
what smiles is a human body. … I react immediately to 
someone else’s behavior. I presuppose the inner in so far 
as I presuppose a human being” (LW II 84). Even pretense 
of feeling is possible only on this basis, and, as John Can-
field rightly suggests, instead of worrying that we might 
never know another person’s mind, we could as well real-
ize that we usually do, and that “the other’s soul is, often, 
just plain visible” (Canfield 157).  
Wittgenstein is skeptical of introspection and the ex-
planations given by philosophers – and not only philoso-
phers – about the inner states and workings of the mind. 
Many of the explanations Freud gave, for instance, Witt-
genstein thinks are completely wrong. But he does not 
speak disrespectfully of the soul and our mental states and 
feelings themselves. He does not try to explain them away, 
and I don’t think he wants to objectify everything. His is not 
a behaviorist. Thus I do not fully agree with Goldstein’s 
reading, that Wittgenstein “had just what he needed” when 
he “got hold of the concepts of seeing-as and aspect-
blindness” to explain things in objective terms. Goldstein 
writes: “For, when looking at a picture of a duck-rabbit, 
although different subjects may flip at different times, they 
flip only between duck and rabbit; this is the objective phe-
nomenon which is quite distinct from any ‘mood, fragrance, 
illumination’” (Goldstein 115). On the one hand, I agree 
that this gives some objective ground to the experience. 
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On the other, I do not think Wittgenstein wanted to explain 
away the subjective side. Of course this depends on what 
exactly we mean by “subjective”.  
Just before introducing the notion of aspect blind-
ness, Wittgenstein talks of spatial perception, mental rep-
resentation (Vorstellung), imagination (Phantasie), and will 
(Wille) (PI IIxi 213). These involve creative human abilities, 
and I think there will always be a subjective side to what 
perception, representation, imagination, and the will are. 
(For a detailed discussion of these passages and the sub-
jective and objective aspects involved, see Wenzel (to 
appear).) Wittgenstein does not avoid talking of such sub-
jective aspects and experiences. To the contrary, he intro-
duces them in preparation for his introducing the notions of 
aspect blindness and meaning blindness. Many of his ex-
amples even have aesthetic aspects to them: a variation of 
a theme, absolute pitch, a musical ear, the sound (Klang) 
of a word, intonation, illustration, imagination, a painting in 
words (Wortgemälde), and Schubert (PI IIxi). I would there-
fore like to contrast his views with Kant’s on aesthetics. 
And there is a further reason for doing this. The English 
translation of “Bedeutungserlebnis” as “meaning experi-
ence” loses some of the flavor of the German original. The 
word “Erlebnis” does not just mean “experience”. It also 
means life: Leben. An Er-lebnis is something you “live” and 
go through, something that touches your inner feelings and 
emotions. Kant’s aesthetics also involves the notions of 
feelings and life, as we shall see. 
Kant does not operate with the notions of the inner 
and the outer. He does not look closely at individual cases, 
nor does he observe fine differences in the “deep gram-
mar” of words. He does not make any empirical statements 
about the inner workings of the mind, and this, one might 
say, saves him from Wittgenstein’s criticisms. But, from 
another perspective, he makes a distinction that we cannot 
find in Wittgenstein, namely between “subject” and “ob-
ject”, and he makes much use of this distinction. Thus he 
begins his aesthetics by saying: “In order to decide 
whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate 
[beziehen] the representation by means of understanding 
to the object for cognition, but rather relate it by means of 
the imagination (perhaps combined with the understand-
ing) to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeas-
ure.” (CJ par. 1, italics mine) 
We can contrast Kant’s explicit and transcendental 
subject-object distinction with Wittgenstein’s worry about 
our overlooking the inner-outer differences in empirical 
phenomena and in deep grammar. Kant is very simple 
here: Transcendentally, there is only one subject and only 
one object. His “faculty talk”, which could be seen as a way 
of explaining what is going on in the mind, involving imagi-
nation, understanding, and the categories, is not meant to 
explain any particular empirical features, but only general 
ones – even universal ones, as Kant would insist from his 
transcendental idealist perspective. Nevertheless, there 
are some aspects in Kant that we can, by way of contrast, 
bring to our reading and understanding of Wittgenstein’s 
fine-tuned analyses.  
According to Kant, in judgments of taste, we “relate” 
the representation not to the object but to the judging sub-
ject. The representation “does not serve for any cognition 
at all, not even that by which the subject cognizes itself” 
(CJ par. 3). This might please Wittgenstein and appease 
his worries that we look at the mental too much in a physi-
calist way. Kant’s radical distinction between subject and 
object thus invites a Kantian therapy of Wittgenstein. But 
this makes use only of the negative side of Kant, that we 
do not cognize ourselves in judgments of taste. There is a 
positive side to him as well. According to Kant, we claim a 
certain subjective universality in our judgments of taste 
that can only be justified by our cognitive abilities being 
involved in the “free play of our cognitive faculties”. We can 
apply this to Wittgenstein’s observing “fine aesthetic differ-
ences” (PI IIxi 219) and his notion of “experiences of 
meaning”: We have learned from Wittgenstein that our 
subjective feelings are interwoven with the objective and 
inter-subjective linguistic meanings of the words that we 
have learned to use. From Kant we learn how the subjec-
tive “free play of imagination and understanding” involves 
those very cognitive faculties that are also applied in objec-
tive judgments (see Wenzel 2005, 27-53). We see the 
duck and the rabbit objectively, but play with possibilities 
subjectively. A word has an objective meaning, but a sub-
jective ring. In each case, the free play leaves its traces 
regarding cognition, in our choice of what to focus on and 
what to associate it with. This is more than mere connota-
tion. Imagination is always more or less free from concep-
tual constraints. It creates and recalls memories and ex-
pectations that we experience anew, thereby affecting 
ourselves in aesthetic reflection. In both views, Kant’s and 
Wittgenstein’s, there are thin lines between the subjective 
aesthetic and the objective epistemic.  
Returning to the notion of Bedeutungserlebnis, we 
can contrast it with Kant’s claim that the subject “feels 
itself” (sich selbst fühlt) when making a judgment of taste, 
and that the subject relates a given representation to the 
“entire faculty of representation” (das ganze Vermögen der 
Vorstellungen) and that it experiences a “feeling of life” 
(Lebensgefühl) (CJ par. 1). It is no coincidence that Kant 
follows his aesthetics with his discussion of teleology in 
biology, and it is also no coincidence that Wittgenstein 
refers to organic life. He talks of the view that it is the 
“mental act of meaning that gives the sentence life [den 
Satz belebt]” (this is his interlocutor’s voice, PI 592) and he 
says that words are germs (Keime) (PI IIxi 217).  
In this context, inter-subjectivity is relevant in both 
Kant and Wittgenstein. In judgments of taste we claim 
inter-subjective universality (Kant), and in the experience 
of meaning we rely on others who have taught us the 
words we use and made it possible for us to develop our 
feelings for them by their recognizing our expressions 
(Wittgenstein). But Kant has more to offer than this. His 
theory of a priori purposiveness for judgments of taste and 
his theory of symbolism, relating beauty to morality, open 
new perspectives towards the future. It seems to me that 
such a move and motivation is missing in Wittgenstein. 
Kant addresses himself to our hopes for a better future. He 
develops his ideas of freedom and humanity under moral 
laws in his works such as his Metaphysics of Morals and 
Towards Perpetual Peace. Kant had a vision, and in re-
sponse to it he wrote. Wittgenstein did not. Although he 
had a fine-tuned aesthetic concern for the actual use of 
particular words, and, as I have explained, there is a cer-
tain sense of responsibility that might come with this, there 
is, at least as far as I can see, less of a vision for a future 
(if at all) in Wittgenstein than in Kant.*  
                                                     
*
 I would like to thank Phil Hutchinson and Joel Schickel for their comments. 
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